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Introduction
Michiru Nagatsu and Attilia Ruzzene
Philosophy of social science is a small but vibrant field, which is attested by the number 
of handbooks and companions: Turner and Roth (2003), Jarvie and Zamora Bonilla 
(2011), Kincaid (2012), Kaldis (2013), and McIntyre and Rosenberg (2017). The 
maturity of the field is suggested by the standard textbooks that have been continuously 
revised—Hollis (1994, revised and updated in 2002), Elster (2015, originally published 
in 1989), and Rosenberg (2016, 5th edition, originally published in 1988)—as well as 
standard readers, both classic (Martin and McIntyre, 1994) and contemporary (Steel 
and Guala, 2011). Two edited volumes from Cambridge (Mantzavinos, 2009) and 
Oxford (Cartwright and Montuschi, 2014) add to these collections.
One will notice in this literature a gradual shift of focus from the demarcation 
question of whether social science can be a proper science—despite the peculiar nature 
of the mental and the social—to the questions concerning actual social scientific 
practices, such as experimentation, model-building, problem-solving, and evidential 
reasoning. This shift is in line with the so-called practical turn in the philosophy of 
science. Accordingly, some philosophers have started adopting a range of empirical 
approaches including bibliometric, ethnographic, case-based, and experimental 
methods to study practices. We can call this an empirical turn. Although the practical 
and empirical turns are sometimes misleadingly interpreted as sociological turns, 
these turns have not changed philosophers’ main interests in ontological, conceptual, 
and methodological issues in science; rather, they have enriched empirical bases for 
philosophizing by enriching the kind of methods to obtain data.
Ambitions of the empirical philosophy of social science in practice thus construed 
include informing and improving social scientific practices. However, there has not 
been a systematic effort on the part of philosophers to increase direct engagement 
with practicing social scientists. This book is a modest attempt to initiate such a move. 
Specifically, it does so by adopting a dialogical template: we invited philosophers and 
social scientists to engage each other and see in what form and to what extent they could 
be partners in the same conversation. Admittedly, the dialogical format is not new in 
the philosophy of social science (e.g., Little 1995; Mantzavinos 2009). However, this 
book is different from these in a crucial respect. While Mantzavinos (2009) and Little 
(1995) had social scientists comment on philosophers’ views on social sciences, we 
decided to reverse the roles. Chapters are written by social scientists with the purpose 
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of showcasing their innovative research, while philosophers partake in the exchange by 
providing commentaries (all commentaries, except one, are written by philosophers). 
Social scientists thus offer an entry point for the conversation. We hoped that this 
“social science first, philosophy second” approach would elicit a different kind of 
dialogue between the two research communities. In particular, we hoped that it would 
encourage philosophers to engage with scientific practices head on, more directly, 
thoroughly, and seriously than when they are free to philosophize about social science.
Have our expectations been met? What kind of materials have social scientists 
brought to the table? And what kind of responses have philosophers provided? In what 
follows, we summarize our findings in the form of a quasi-scientific report.
Methods
We identified an initial pool of approximately twenty social scientists on the basis of our 
background knowledge, interests, and networks, whose work we thought was suitable 
and exciting because of its theoretically and methodologically innovative features. 
We approached them by e-mail, explicitly requesting them to expose the innovative 
aspects of their work. They were also informed that a philosopher who specializes in 
relevant fields would provide a detailed commentary. Thirteen social scientists out 
of this initial pool showed interest in our initiative and accepted to participate in it. 
One scholar agreed to contribute, but never followed up. One had to be excluded due 
to misunderstandings about the focus of the chapter. As a result, we obtained eleven 
manuscripts. The manuscripts went through anonymous reviewing processes and a 
round or two of revision, some minor and others major. After the manuscripts have 
been completed, we asked philosophers of social sciences with relevant expertise to 
provide critical commentaries. We the editors substituted as commentators on two 
chapters for which we could not find philosophers suitable to the task or willing to 
participate. The editors have reviewed and commented on the commentaries, which 
have been finalized after a round or two of revision (each editor’s commentary was 
reviewed by the other).
Results
What kind of trends did we find in this exchange? First, we found that some of the 
social scientists have well-articulated philosophical concerns. They grapple with the 
same philosophical and methodological questions that philosophers of social science 
discuss, such as the ontology of the social world or the methodology of causal inference. 
In these domains, philosophical and social scientific questions largely coincide. The 
exchange between social scientists’ contributions and philosophers’ responses is, as a 
result, not only smooth but also mutually enriching since it provides partly different 
answers to what are in fact very similar questions. Thus, the philosopher and the social 
scientist talk to each other in a way that enables them to advance a shared agenda. We 
see this kind of exchange exemplified, for instance, by David Waldner and Daniel Steel 
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who provide alternative interpretations of process tracing while trying to resolve what 
they both recognize as the problematic aspects of a specific practice. In a similar vein, 
Nancy Cartwright argues for an extension of Michael Woolcock’s proposal to use mixed 
methods in policy evaluation so as to include a broader population of interventions.
These productive exchanges suggest that philosophers are already informing 
and improving scientific practices in some domains, together with social scientists. 
The two research communities happily overlap in such domains. This overlap is due 
partly to philosophers’ increasing attention to scientific practice, but also due to the 
problems in question being inherently philosophical, disposing the social scientists 
to adopt philosophical approaches in formulating or framing the problem they are 
working on.
In a second—perhaps more traditional—kind of exchange, philosophers 
elaborate, clarify, or even correct social scientists’ characterizations of their own 
practices. Sometimes the philosopher provides a sort of philosophical backbone to 
the interpretation outlined by the social scientist. This would be, for instance, the 
case of Stephen Turner commenting on Michael Carleheden’s discussion on the 
role of social theory in sociology. Other times the philosopher provides a rationale 
for the practice at hand, clarifying the methodological and theoretical import of the 
innovation advocated by the social scientist. Exemplary of this type of exchange is 
Daniel Little’s commentary on Wendy Olsen’s discussion of the role of critical realism 
in social statistics. In yet other cases, the philosopher, while seeing the reasons and 
goals behind a given practice, points out underlying misunderstandings that could 
impair or obfuscate its potential. This is illustrated by Petri Ylikoski’s commentary on 
the discussion of temporal modeling by Tommaso Venturini. In all these cases the 
philosopher’s contribution amounts to sharpening the philosophical underpinning of 
the practice in a way that not only makes it philosophically sounder but also clears the 
path where further benefits and developments could or should be sought.
In these cases, we find that some of the standard analytic and conceptual tools 
developed in the philosophy of (social) science have proved useful. These tools—
realism, the micro-macro distinction, social ontology, under-determination, scientific 
pluralism, interpretivism versus positivism, and so on—do not directly solve social 
scientific problems, but they are useful in helping us understand practice better.
Discussion
In this section, we briefly address some of the limitations of our study and suggest an area 
we think philosophers of social science need to study. As noted in the introduction, the 
main goal of the book was to facilitate a new kind of dialogue between social scientists 
and philosophers led by the former. This design probably created a self-selection 
bias toward those social scientists who are more likely to be philosophically minded 
than the average researcher in their field. We think that this bias served our purpose, 
namely to initiate and facilitate collaborative and critical interactions between the two 
communities. But in general, an empirical study of social scientific practices should 
pay attention to the self-selection bias.
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Potentially problematic is our selection of the target social science disciplines and 
fields. Our selection is by no means a balanced and comprehensive sample from the 
state of the art in the social sciences. It has a clear bias toward economics and related 
fields, such as business research, econometrics, evaluation of development policies, 
ecological economics, and, to a less extent, sociology and political science. Other 
fields such as anthropology, psychology, social epidemiology, and so on are absent. 
This is partly due to the bias in the editors’ areas of expertise, but also it reflects the 
bias of the current philosophy of social science in general.1 We have no intention to 
endorse such a bias as a good thing. Rather, we simply acknowledge that we, as the 
editors, are part of the bias and encourage the reader to consult the handbooks and 
edited volumes mentioned in the introduction that address this selection bias to some 
extent.
Whereas the biases discussed above can be justified by appealing to the primary 
purpose of the book and the path-dependence of the literature in which the project 
is embedded, there is another, more important, limitation that we should address 
here: we could not cover many of the emerging new methodological innovations that 
are somehow philosophically relevant and likely to trigger the interest and reactions of 
philosophers of the social sciences in the near future, if they haven’t done so already. 
Below we would like to briefly discuss one such area of relevance, big data, to indicate 
that there is much more uncharted area of potential mutual engagement between 
social scientists and philosophers.
The digital revolution and the advent of big data generated changes across 
social sciences. Specialized journals have been founded (e.g., Big Data and Society) 
and established journals have guested special issues dedicated to the topic (e.g., 
International Journal of Sociology, Journal of Psychological Methods, Journal of Business 
& Economics Statistics, Political Science and Politics, just to name a few). This turn has 
caused a broad range of novelties. First, the most tangible and immediate effect is that 
a massive amount of data, which are different in relevant respects from traditional 
data (Leney 2004; Kitchin 2014; Leonelli, 2014; Kitchin and McArdle 2016), have 
become available, constituting an additional source of evidence for the phenomena 
and processes that have been already studied, for example, use of web search data to 
estimate unemployment: Ettredge et al. (2005); D’Amuri (2009); Fondeur and Karamé 
(2013); and Askitas and Zimmermann (2015) Second, the turn has generated novel 
social, economic, and political phenomena worth investigating on their own. Consider 
as an example the work of political scientist Jonathan Bright (2018), who studies 
how political fragmentation in social media increases radicalization and how social 
media affect patterns of news sharing (Bright 2016), or the work of media scholar 
Zizi Papacharissi (2010), who theorizes on how digital technologies have shifted 
civic engagement from the public to the private sphere and introduces the concept 
of affective publics to explain how social movement use digital media to generate 
engagement and make their voice matter in politics (Papacharissi 2015). The third 
novelty concerns methodology. The digital revolution makes the traditional tools of 
research more powerful and also generates new ones, giving rise to new fields such as 
digital humanities. Finally, the digital revolution has stimulated the critical approach 
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in the social sciences. For example, the Gender and ICT research group at the Open 
University of Catalonia was established in 2006 to study data intensive research 
methods from a feminist perspective. One of its goals is to investigate the ways in 
which new data conceptualizations, technologies, and related social practices can be 
used for transformative societal changes.
Philosophers of science have only recently started paying attention to the digital 
turn in the sciences (with the notable exception of Sabina Leonelli, who has published 
extensively on the advent of digitization and big data mainly in the biological sciences). 
Other philosophical contributions have so far focused on big data as forecasting 
tools (Hosni and Vulpiani 2017), theory-ladenness (Pietsch 2015), epistemology 
and causality (Canali 2016), modeling in data-intensive science (Pietsch 2016), and 
philosophy of information (Floridi 2012). However, contributions focusing on the 
social sciences are still scant. Much more investigation is needed into how social 
mediatization contributes to the dissemination of scientific knowledge and its 
transformation (e.g., by reducing its complexity), and how this will affect society and 
policy making at large.
As the big data case indicates, social scientific practices are changing in response 
to the technological and societal changes. Philosophers and social scientists can work 
together to understand and respond to these changes. We hope this book will help 
facilitate a collaborative dialogue between the two communities.
How to Use This Book
We will close this introduction by offering some guide on how to use this volume 
in courses on the philosophy of social science. The instructor can use this book as a 
philosophical guide to three salient trends in social sciences in practice: issues raised by 
the plurality of approaches, disciplines, and theories (Part One: Chapters 1–3); debates 
over choices of one method over another and the need to mix multiple methods (Part 
Two:  Chapters  4–8); and issues around the methodology and foundation of social 
scientific explanation and theorizing (Part Three: Chapters 9–11). Alternatively, the 
reader can organize chapters according to the philosophical concepts that have been 
used by commentators. For instance, mechanism and social causation (Chapters 7, 8, 
and 11), causal inference (Chapters 4, 5, and 9), theory choice (Chapters 3 and 10); 
scientific pluralism (Chapters 1 and 2), and interpretivism (Chapter 6). In either way, 
we recommend the instructor to require students to read a chapter and its commentary 
as a set and have them discuss whether the philosopher and the social scientist talk 
past each other, or their exchange is fruitful.
We have two cautions. The book highlights the domains where we think potential 
gains from exchange between social scientists and philosophers are high, rather than 
evenly covering all the areas in the social sciences. The second caution concerns the 
level. Some chapters and commentaries presuppose some familiarity with technical 
details of theories, methods, and philosophical concepts. The instructor may want to 
provide introductory materials before assigning those chapters to students.
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Note
 1 For example, Philosophy of Economics is by far the biggest subcategory under the 
category Philosophy of Social Science at PhilPapers.org (11,324 entries out of 59,698 
as of September 2018). Note that the other bigger two subcategories, Philosophy of 
Education (27,438) and Philosophy of Law (17,915), are usually not considered to be 
part of the Philosophy of Social Science.
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